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The year 2016 was marked by the successful conclusion of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (“tpp”)1 and the panel ruling in Indonesia – Import 
Licensing Regimes, a case brought by New Zealand (together with the United 
States) against several Indonesian import restrictions on horticultural and 
 animal products.2 Another highlight in the international economic law arena 
was the finalization of the legal text of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Eco-
nomic Relations (“pacer Plus”), which aims at economic integration between 
 Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island countries.3 At the same time, 
further trade integration has come under fire worldwide. Two events epitomize 
this: the outcome of the Brexit referendum to withdraw the United Kingdom 
from the European Union and the election of Donald Trump, an outspoken 
critic of the tpp and the North American Free Trade Agreement,4 as the 45th 
president of the United States. It is expected that these developments will have 
significant implications for the trade landscape in 2017.
1 Preferential Trade
The government is negotiating free trade agreements (“ftas”) with a view to 
increasing export opportunities for New Zealand businesses as well as  legal 
certainty, thus making the risks associated with cross-border trade more 
predictable.5
1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership <https://www.tpp.mfat.govt 
.nz/>.
2 Panel Report, Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Prod-
ucts, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/
Corr.1 (22 December 2016).
3 Radio New Zealand, Pacific countries agree to trade agreement’s legal text (26 August 2016) 
<http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/311908/pacific-countries-agree 
-to-trade-agreement%27s-legal-text>.
4 North American Free Trade Agreement, signed 17 December 1992, (1993) 32 ilm 289 (entered 
into force 1 January 1994).
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trade Agenda 2030, 18–19 <https://www.mfat.Trade2030/
Trade-Agenda-2030-Strategy-document.govt.nz/assets/_securedfiles/pdf>.
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The tpp was signed in Auckland on 4 February 2016 and New Zealand has been 
designated as the depository for the tpp. It brings together the economies of 
New Zealand, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Viet Nam into one mega trad-
ing bloc. The combined gdp of these 12 parties amounts to 36 per cent of world 
gdp.6 The Agreement, once in force, will have a massive economic impact. For 
New Zealand, it would mean the first free trade agreement with Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, Peru, and the United States. 95.4 per cent of all customs duties on New 
Zealand exports to these countries will be eventually eliminated.7 Further-
more, for the first time, an investor-state dispute settlement (“isds”) mecha-
nism would be in place, giving investors from those countries the right to take 
legal action against New Zealand government measures. In terms of regulatory 
impact, most changes concern New Zealand’s intellectual property (“ip”) laws, 
leading to a higher level of ip protection as compared to the wto Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“trips Agreement”).8 
Among other things, the protection of data in marketing approval procedures 
for new agricultural chemicals will be extended from five to 10 years; copyright 
protection will go up to life plus 70 years; and to compensate for unreasonable 
delays in the examination process, patent terms can be extended. Besides, New 
Zealand Customs Service is granted more powers to detain counterfeit goods 
and pirated copyright protected works at the border.9 The tpp Amendment Bill 
was passed in November. Pursuant to s 2, the Bill will commence when the tpp 
enters into force. New Zealand is set to ratify the tpp in 2017.
There is one big caveat, however: the Agreement, as it stands, cannot en-
ter into force without the United States. According to tpp art 30.5, at least 85 
per cent of the combined gdp of the signatories in 2013 are required for the 
Agreement to enter into force. This requirement cannot be met without us 
participation.
1.2 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
The negotiations for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“rcep”) 
are ongoing. As of 2016, 16 negotiation rounds took place, the last one in Jakarta 
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership  <https://www.tpp.mfat.govt 
.nz/>.
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trans-Pacific Partnership National Interest Analysis (25 
January 2016) 38.
8 wto Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, signed 15 April 1994, 
1869 unts 299 (entered into force 1 January 1995).
9 See the entire Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Amendment Bill at <http://www.legislation 
.govt.nz/bill/government/2016/0133/latest/whole.html#DLM6838023>.
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in December. The leaders of the participating countries set out seemingly con-
flicting objectives in a joint statement, namely the “swift conclusion” of the 
negotiations while achieving a “high-quality” agreement at the same time.10
rcep is of economic significance to New Zealand, as it would establish a 
free trade area with countries with which New Zealand currently has no bilat-
eral agreement, i.e. India and Japan.11 There are other designated signatories 
that have no bilateral free trade agreement in place at present, such as China/
India, China/Japan, Japan/Korea, and Australia/India.
It should be stressed that the secrecy, criticised throughout the negotiations 
of the tpp, persist with respect to rcep. Not even position papers, as is the 
modern practice of the European Commission when negotiating trade agree-
ments, are provided by the government to the public.12 In terms of  transparency 
and accountability this is lamentable, since it is inconceivable that abstract 
statements, such as the formulation of negotiation goals and an outline of is-
sues, would in any way jeopardize the government’s room for manoeuvre. Also, 
more transparency would pre-empt the ever more prevalent leaking of docu-
ments. Generally speaking, to have a say in the outcome, people have to be able 
to influence the fta negotiations. The ratification process, being a yes or no 
decision, is too late to alter the legal text.
1.3 New Zealand–India Free Trade Agreement
Aside from rcep, New Zealand pursues trade liberalization with India through 
a second channel, namely bilaterally. The bilateral agreement is intended to 
form a safety net should the plurilateral negotiations come to nothing. It is clear, 
however, that should the liberalization level achieved plurilaterally exceed the 
bilateral deal, it will be of little practical import. In this connection, it should 
be noted that bilateral agreements usually include a  most-favoured-nation 
(“mfn”) obligation with respect to services and investment, not goods, so that 
further tariff reductions would not need to be plurilateralized.13
10 See Joint Leaders’ Statement on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (8 Sep-
tember 2016, Vientiane, Laos) <http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/56-RCEP_Joint-Leaders 
-Statement_8-September-2016.pdf>.
11 Should the tpp enter into force, New Zealand would have an agreement with Japan, 
namely the tpp of which Japan would be just like New Zealand a constituent member.
12 The European Union even publishes draft texts. See, e.g., for the eu–Japan Economic 
Partnership Agreement, European Commission, eu–Japan trade agreement: texts of 
the agreement in principle (6 July 2017) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index 
.cfm?id=1684>.
13 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between The Government of New Zealand And The Govern-
ment of the People’s Republic of China Ch. 3.
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1.4 New Zealand–China Free Trade Agreement
New Zealand and China decided at the end of 2016 that it is time to upgrade 
their existing free trade agreement, as new business sectors have gained in im-
portance.14 Digital trade is a case in point. The agreement entered into force 
in 2008 and was the first free trade agreement to be concluded by China with 
a Western country. Since then the trade relationship with China has almost 
tripled over the past decade according to Statistics New Zealand.15 It is likely 
that the upgrade will take account of the ongoing negotiations at the regional 
level, i.e. rcep.
As to the protection of foreign investments, the national treatment ob-
ligation in the nz–China fta does not include the pre-establishment phase 
as of yet.16 It bears noting, however, that, as a result of access granted to the 
residential property market in the Free Trade Agreement Between New Zea-
land and the Republic of Korea,17 the government can no longer discriminate 
against Chinese house buyers because of the mfn clause in nz–China fta art 
139(1), which encompasses “admission”. The nz–Korea fta was after the en-
try into force of the nz–China fta18 and the purchase of residential property 
is a  covered investment (given the expected capital gains). The require-
ment of  prior government approval, as set out in Annex ii to the nz–Korea 
fta, does not relate to residential property, unless it is on protected areas, 
such as  heritage sites or scenically valuable areas. According to Land Infor-
mation New Zealand, Chinese were the biggest group of foreign house buy-
ers in April–June 2016.19 As a side note, under the tpp, New Zealand secured 
a reservation relating to the taxation of residential property in the Annex ii  
Schedule.
14 Joint Statement Between New Zealand and the People’s Republic of China on the Up-
grade of the China-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/ 
assets/FTAs-agreements-in-force/China-FTA/China-NZ-JMS-FTA-upgrade.pdf>.
15 Statistics nz, Trade with China nearly tripled in past decade (7 September 2016) <http://
www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/imports_and_exports/trade-china 
-tripled-decade.aspx>.
16 nz–China fta art 138.
17 The national treatment obligation in the investment chapter extends to the “establish-
ment” and “acquisition” of investments, art 10.5.
18 This is relevant because of nz–China fta art 139(3).
19 Tom Pullar-Strecker, 3 per cent of nz house buyers officially from overseas (1 August 2016) 
Stuff <http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/82682551/fresh-attempt-to-calculate 
-impact-of-overseas-home-buyers>.
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1.5 Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (pacer Plus)
A Special Pacific Islands Trade Ministers Meeting took place in Christchurch 
on 26 August 2016. At that meeting, the ministers finalized the text of pacer 
Plus. The Agreement is not just a trade agreement, but is also conceived as 
an economic development agreement, as shown by the long timeframes to 
eliminate customs duties.20 Its main focus is on increasing living standards.21 
The Agreement’s investment chapter does not provide for isds, nor does the 
Agreement contain a chapter on intellectual property protection. This is reflec-
tive of the economic development of the Pacific Island countries. In the final 
analysis, the regime, as laid out in pacer Plus, is less integrative than the one 
under New Zealand’s other free trade agreements.
Both Australia and New Zealand pledged to provide funds to help Pacific 
Island countries with the implementation of pacer Plus.22 With a view to 
enhancing labour mobility within the region, the parties concluded a side 
agreement on labour mobility, which is not binding, however. This concerns 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
1.6 New Zealand–European Union Free Trade Agreement
Surprisingly, there are some pitfalls around the New Zealand-European Union 
fta negotiations which should otherwise be a straightforward deal among two 
like-minded entities as far as trade matters are concerned. For good reason, 
New Zealand has been a latecomer in terms of countries with which the Eu-
ropean Union launched trade negotiations, and remoteness is only part of the 
story. Mindful that New Zealand is an agricultural powerhouse, for the free 
trade agreement to be economically meaningful for New Zealand, it will have 
to make an impact on the notorious eu agricultural regime, the so-called Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, particularly its centrepieces: quotas, tariff quotas, 
and agricultural subsidies. Another area of contention, where New Zealand 
has a great economic interest, concerns the services sectors. New Zealand is a 
 services provider, as shown by its increasing gdp from services.23
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
( pacer) Plus National Interest Analysis (6 June 2017) 8.
21 See recital 3 to the Preamble.
22 See Implementing Arrangement for Development and Economic Cooperation under 
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus, available at <https://www 
.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/pacer/
pacer-plus-full-text/>.
23 Trading Economics, New Zealand gdp From Services (2017) <www.tradingeconomics 
.com/new-zealand/gdp-from-services>.
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In October, the European Union and New Zealand signed the Partnership 
Agreement on Relations and Cooperation, according to European treaty prac-
tice, a precursor to a fully-fledged free trade agreement. An open question is 
the New Zealand-United Kingdom trade relationship after Brexit. Both coun-
tries started a trade policy dialogue with a view to sounding out the feasibility 
of a bilateral agreement.24
As to the future negotiation agenda, it will be interesting to see how the 
New Zealand government responds to the establishment of an investment 
court  system promoted by Canada and the European Union through the Com-
prehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, which was signed on 30 October 
2016. Slightly higher ip standards, notably with respect to geographical indi-
cations, can be expected following an fta with the European Union. Those 
 higher standards would need to be multilateralized, given that the trips 
Agreement does not have an economic integration exception. As a corollary, 
the level of ip protection in New Zealand would be lifted in general.
2 World Trade
2.1 Environmental Goods Agreement
The negotiations for an Environmental Goods Agreement under the auspices 
of the World Trade Organization (“wto”) are ongoing. The objective is to reach 
an agreement on the full elimination of customs duties on goods that contrib-
ute to sustainable development and are used to combat pollution, for example, 
solar water heaters or recycling machinery.25
2.2 Trade in Services Agreement (“TiSA”)
New Zealand is one of 23 parties to negotiate a Trade in Services Agreement, 
which has as its goal the liberalization of trade in services beyond the level laid 
down in the General Agreement on Trade in Services.26 The negotiations, oc-
curring outside the wto, are testament to the growing importance of services 
to the global economy. In 2016 the parties conducted a stocktaking exercise. 
24 Todd McClay, “nz establishes trade policy dialogue with uk” (Press Release, 18 October 
2016) <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-establishes-trade-policy-dialogue-uk>.
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Environmental Goods Agreement <https://www.mfat 
.govt.nz/en/trade/our-work-with-the-wto/environmental-goods-agreement-ega/>.
26 General Agreement on Trade in Services, signed 15 April 1994, 1869 unts 183 (entered into 
force 1 January 1995).
Christian Riffel - 9789004345911
Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2020 02:38:56AM
via University of Canterbury
Riffel260
<UN>
No conclusion has been reached yet. TiSA parties account for approximately 
70 per cent of worldwide trade in services.27
2.3 wto Cases
2.3.1 Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes
The Indonesia-New Zealand trade dispute was decided in favour of New Zea-
land in December. New Zealand beef exports had fallen by 80 per cent as a 
result of Indonesian import restrictions.28 The Panel found these restrictions 
inconsistent with wto law.
The case is of systemic importance, as it clarified some moot points. As far 
as state responsibility for private actors is concerned, the Panel followed the 
ruling of the Appellate Body in the us – cool case. wto Members set the 
regulatory framework within which private actors operate. That framework 
can be challenged before the wto, even though particular decisions within 
that given framework are taken by private actors. The prerequisite for state 
responsibility in this case is that the private actions have been incentivized by 
the set framework.29
On the procedural side, the Panel held that a change of the measure at is-
sue after the establishment of the panel is immaterial to the panel’s terms of 
reference.30 In order to make a prima facie case, a complainant does not need 
to show that the measure at issue actually impinged on trade volumes. Even if 
trade volumes have gone up while a measure was in force, that measure may 
still constitute a quantitative restriction.31 Conversely, data that demonstrates 
that trade has decreased since the entry into force of the measure can be used 
27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) <https://www 
.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-negotiation/tisa/>.
28 Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products, wto 
Doc WT/DS466/1, G/L/1038, G/AG/GEN/113, G/LIC/D/46, G/PSI/D/2 (9 September 2013) 
( Request for Consultations by New Zealand) [2].
29 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [7.6], [7.346], quoting Appellate 
Body Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (cool) Requirements, 
wto Doc WT/DS384/AB/R, WT/DS386/AB/R (23 July 2012) [291].
30 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [6.24].
31 See Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, wto 
Doc WT/DS34/R (19 November 1999) [9.204].
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as evidence to buttress a claim of restriction.32 As noted by Davies before, trade 
effects can be “a decisive evidential consideration.”33
With respect to Article xi of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“gatt”),34 the Panel ruled that automatic import licensing systems fall under 
its remit.35 In order to ascertain whether a particular measure constitutes a 
quantitative restriction, the combined effect of its requirements has to be ex-
amined.36 As regards trade in agricultural or fisheries products, the Panel held 
that gatt art XI:2(c)(ii) has been overridden by Agreement on Agriculture art 
4.2.37
Indonesia invoked several exceptions of gatt art XX to defend its import 
licensing regimes. As to gatt art XX(d), the Panel observed that the ruling 
of the Appellate Body in us – Carbon Steel that ‘a responding Member’s law 
will be treated as wto-consistent until proven otherwise’38 does not relieve 
the respondent of the duty to provide the legal texts of the legal instruments 
it seeks compliance with. Merely enumerating national laws or regulations is 
not sufficient.39 Indonesia’s other attempts under gatt art XX failed as well 
because the measures did not refer to any of the policy objectives listed in art 
XX as their rationale. It is true that the burden of proof is incumbent upon “the 
party invoking an exception”.40 Who bears the burden of proof is one thing; 
another thing is the standard of proof. In this regard, Van den Bossche and 
Prévost noted that
32 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [7.88], [7.323].
33 Arwel Davies, “Interpreting the Chapeau of gatt Article XX in Light of the ‘New’ 
 Approach in Brazil-Tyres” (2017) 43(3) Journal of World Trade 507, 516.
34 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, adopted 15 April 1994, 1867 unts 187 ( entered 
into force 1 January 1995).
35 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [7.56].
36 Ibid [7.109]–[7.111], [7.268], [7.317], [7.476].
37 Ibid [7.60]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for 
signature 15 April 1994, 1867 unts 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), annex 1A (Agree-
ment on Agriculture) 1867 unts 190.
38 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion Re-
sistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, wto Doc WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1 
(19 December 2002) 157.
39 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [7.581].
40 See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, wto Doc WT/DS2/R (20 May 1996) [6.20], [6.35].
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Although a Member’s articulation of the objective(s) of the measure at 
issue should be taken into account, a panel is not bound by this and must 
take account of all evidence put before it in this regard including the texts 
of statutes, legislative history and other evidence regarding the structure 
and operation of the measure.41
In the present case, the Panel focussed on the text of the measures at issue and 
found that Indonesia did not meet the above threshold.42 The reasoning was 
akin to the one adopted by the Panel in China – Raw Materials, where “China 
[the respondent] was unable to substantiate its claim that its [measures at is-
sue] are part of a comprehensive programme maintained in order to reduce 
pollution”.43 To be justified, the measures must be designed to protect, for ex-
ample, public morals (art XX(a)) or public health (art XX(b)). The true object 
and purpose of the import licensing regimes, however, was simplification and 
administration of the import process.44 None of these is an accepted ground 
of justification under gatt art XX, whose list of justifiable policy objectives is 
exhaustive.45
Indonesia already announced that it will appeal the ruling.46 In this context, 
it is worth noting that Indonesia is a designated signatory to rcep.
2.3.2 Third Party Participation
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“dsu”)47 enables non-disputing Mem-
bers to make written submissions to wto panels and the Appellate Body.48 
New Zealand’s third party involvement relates to agricultural products, thus 
reflecting the country’s export interests.
41 Peter Van den Bossche and Denise Prévost, Essentials of wto Law (cup, 2016) 89.
42 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [7.631], [7.657], [7.678]–[7.679].
43 Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, wto 
Doc WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (22 February 2012) [7.516].
44 Panel Report, Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, wto Doc WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, 
modified by WT/DS477/R/Corr.1, WT/DS478/R/Corr.1, [7.631], [7.657], [7.678], [7.739], 
[7.773f], [7.794].
45 Unlike Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art 2.2 (“inter alia”).
46 World Trade Organization, DS477: Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, 
Animals and Animal Products (2017) <www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds477_e.htm>.
47 wto Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes 
( adopted 15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 unts 401.
48 dsu arts 10.2, 17.4.
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Korea – Radionuclides49 is concerned with certain testing and certification 
requirements for radionuclides imposed by Korea on food products from  Japan 
in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident.
Indonesia – Chicken50 concerns measures similar to the ones challenged by 
New Zealand in Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes, just in a different agri-
cultural sector. New Zealand has an interest in transparent market access given 
the importance of Indonesia as an export market for New Zealand agricultural 
products.51
us – Tuna ii52 is about eco-labelling, in the present case regarding dolphin-
safe harvesting. New Zealand has a stake in this foodstuff-related issue in terms 
of policy reforms. In 2016 the case has gone in its second round of compliance 
proceedings.
Another case of relevance to New Zealand is the Tobacco Plain Packaging 
case against Australia,53 as New Zealand is poised to introduce similar legisla-
tion. However, as of 2016, the case has not been decided yet.
49 World Trade Organization, DS495: Korea – Import Bans, and Testing and Certification Re-
quirements for Radionuclides <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/
ds495_e.htm>.
50 World Trade Organization, DS484: Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of 
Chicken Meat and Chicken Products <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds484_e.htm>.
51 Observatory of Economic Complexity, What does Indonesia import from New Zea-
land? (2016) <http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/idn/nzl/
show/2016/>.
52 World Trade Organization, DS381: United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds381_e.htm>.
53 Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other 
Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, wto Doc 
WT/DS434, WT/DS435, WT/DS441, WT/DS458, WT/DS467.
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